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Research and development (R&D) agreements however are considered to create efciency gains that are likely to oset their potential anti-competitive eects, and consequently benet from a block exemption as long as the market share of participants is lower than 25%. Even R&D agreements involving rms with a total market share higher than 25% may be allowed.
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The anti-competitive concerns of the EU Competition Commission as well as US antitrust authorities regarding R&D agreements are essentially of three types:
2 First, rms may want to engage in R&D agreements in order to slow down R&D eorts and reduce variety on the nal market. Second, R&D cooperation may be transferred to other markets and lead to increased nal prices. Finally, R&D agreements may lead to market foreclosure. The main concern of competition authorities is thus the direct restriction of competition on the nal market that may result from an R&D agreement. Less attention however is given to the indirect eect of R&D agreements on competition through the market for inputs necessary for R&D.
In this paper, we highlight one specic means through which an R&D agreement may indirectly deter entry on the nal market through entry deterrence on the market for R&D inputs. We also show that R&D agreements may be anti-competitive even when members of the R&D agreement increase their R&D eorts. Indeed, when rms must compete to purchase some inputs necessary for R&D, members of the agreement may increase their R&D eorts only to increase the cost of R&D for their rivals, hence reducing competition on the nal market. Although increasing R&D also increases the eciency of the members of the agreement, this second eect may be oset by the former.
Besides often competing on the same nal market, rms engaging in (similar) R&D activities need inputs for which they also have to compete, the main example of which is skilled workers. According to a survey by the US National Science Founda- tion, wages and related labor costs accounted for more than 40% of the US industrial R&D costs in the 1990s, and for 46.6% in 2006. Although this hides a relative variety among industries, labor-related costs are a particularly large part of R&D costs in large R&D consuming industries such as pharmaceuticals and medicine (where labor costs represent 28.8% of all R&D costs), computer and electronic products (51.9%), computer systems designing (55.3%) and information (62%).
3 Parallel to this, concerns are often raised both by rms in innovative markets and by governments as to the need for more research personnel. 4 High skilled labor, especially labor in the science and technology elds typically needed for R&D activities is usually characterized by signicantly lower unemployment rates than other types of labor, and some countries such as Germany have suered from skills shortage in the past years.
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Given the more or less stringent capacity constraint on skilled labor, one can then argue that R&D costs of rms engaging in similar R&D activities are not as independent from one another as is usually assumed. 6 Then, there exists a risk that rms with enough market power on the market for R&D inputs manage to prevent the entry of rms with less market power on this market. This is a particularly legitimate concern in R&D intensive industries, as they are often characterized by large size asymmetries between the rms. Focusing for example on the biotechnology industry, one can nd at dierent levels of the innovation and production process large pharmaceutical companies competing with medium sized to very small biotechnology companies. The IT services industry is characterized by the same type of market structure: in 2001, while only 0.2% of the IT service companies in that although the industry-wide joint-venture is the social optimum, the equilibrium structure may be such that not all rms are part of the joint-venture. In this framework, members of the joint-venture use the membership rule to enjoy a cost advantage relative to outsiders. Carlton and Salop (1996) highlight that similar exclusionary practices may arise in the case of input joint-ventures, where the jointventure may prevent some (possibly more ecient) rms from entering the jointventure or by reducing rival input producers' incentives to enter the input market.
In this paper, contrary to the previous literature, we assume that R&D requires an input available to all rms on the same market, and that the price of the R&D input increases quickly with demand for the input. In order to take into account some distinctive features of R&D intensive industries, we consider a market where all rms have to engage in R&D to be able to produce output, and where two strategic rms compete with one another and with a competitive fringe. While strategic rms have market power both on the nal market and on the market for the R&D input, fringe rms are price-takers on the two markets. Then, strategic rms anticipate that purchasing more R&D inputs will enhance their own eciency on the one hand and increase the cost of fringe rms on the other hand. This induces part of the fringe to leave the market and softens competition on the nal market. To this extent, this article is related to the literature on raising rivals' costs strategies, rst studied by Scheman (1983, 1987) , in a framework with one dominant rm and a competitive fringe. More generally, Riordan (1998) The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the general model. In Section 3 we determine the R&D input purchase decisions of strategic rms in the presence of a competitive fringe. In Section 4, we compare our results to two benchmarks: when the size of the competitive fringe is exogenous and when R&D costs are independent from one rm to another. In Section 5, we derive a welfare analysis. In Section 6, we oer some extensions to test the robustness of some of our assumptions. Section 7 concludes.
Model
Consider a market where two strategic rms denoted by 1 and 2 compete in quantity with each other and with a competitive fringe to sell a homogeneous good. We denote by p(Q) the inverse demand function, where Q is the total quantity sold on the nal market. The inverse demand function p is twice dierentiable and such that p < 0 and p Q + p < 0. Fringe rms are price-takers on the nal market.
As we focus on R&D intensive industry such as biotechnology or software de-6 signing, we assume that R&D investment is a sine qua non condition for entering the market. Therefore, a rm enters the market by buying at least one unit of R&D input. Besides, buying more than one unit of R&D input increases the rm's productive eciency. We denote by k i ∈ [1, +∞) the amount of R&D input purchased by strategic rm i, and we assume that a fringe rm can only buy 1 or 0 unit of R&D input. Then, the cost of producing the cost of a fringe rm producing q f is C(q f ), whereas q i for strategic rm i is given by γk i C(q i /k i ). The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] thus represents the eciency advantage of strategic rms over fringe rms: the lower γ, the higher this eciency advantage. The function C is assumed twice dierentiable, increasing and convex. Using similar cost functions for the fringe and the strategic rms allows us to reduce the dierence between the two types of rms to one parameter and simplies the analysis. Besides, as far as the fringe is concerned, it is reasonable to assume convex costs as it represents the capacity constraint of these rms. In that sense, the parameter γ is a measure of the dierence between the capacity constraint of the fringe rms and the strategic rms. Indeed, the lower γ, the atter the cost function of the strategic rms relative to the fringe rms.
All rms buy the R&D input on a common market represented by the supply function R(K), where K = k 1 + k 2 is the demand for R&D input of strategic rms.
In order to simplify computations, we assume that the R&D input purchase of fringe rms does not aect the price of R&D. We will however show in Section 4 that our results are qualitatively the same if we assume that fringe rms' R&D purchase similarly aects R (that is if we instead assume that K = k 1 + k 2 + n). R is assumed twice dierentiable, increasing and convex, which reects the existence of a capacity constraint on the input. We assume that fringe rms are price-takers on the R&D input market. As a fringe rm either buys one unit of R&D input and enters the market or buys no R&D input and stays out, R(K) can be interpreted as the entry cost of fringe rms. Finally, the size of the fringe n is thus equal to the total amount of R&D input bought by fringe rms, and is assumed continuous.
Strategic rms can then compete both on the input and output markets, or cooperate on the input market. Such a cooperation can be interpreted as a research joint venture and is thus legal. For simplicity, we assume that there are no synergies due to research cooperation. However, we will show later that our results hold even if such synergies exist. Assuming that cooperation on the input market is legal allows us to consider only the static game, as rms can design a contract that denes the terms of cooperation and of the punishment in case of a deviation, and can be enforced by law. Fringe rms are price-takers on the input market.
The timing of the game is as follows. The outcome of each stage is subsequently observed.
1. Strategic rms simultaneously invest in R&D. Firm i's R&D input demand is denoted by k i (i = 1, 2). If they are competing in R&D, then i sets k i to maximize its own prot. If however they are cooperating in R&D, then i sets k i to maximize the joint prot of the two strategic rms.
2. Fringe rms decide whether or not to enter the market by each purchasing one unit of R&D input. Entry is free and n denotes the size of the fringe at the end of this stage.
3. Strategic rms simultaneously set their output on the nal market. Firm i's output is denoted by q i .
Fringe rms simultaneously set their output on the nal market.
The game is solved by backward induction.
Note that we do not endogenize the decision of strategic rms to cooperated or not, but merely compare their purchasing behaviour when they are competing and cooperating on the upstream market. However, considering the numerical example of Section 5, cooperation is always protable for the strategic rms. Therefore, were the choice of cooperation endogenous in that case, rms would always choose cooperation. We thus assume that this is also the case in the more general model presented here.
R&D Decisions
In this section, we determine conditions under which nal price is increasing in the R&D input purchase of strategic rms, and conditions under which strategic rms buy more R&D input when they form a R&D joint venture than when they compete on the R&D market. 8 
Quantity setting
We show here that for a given size of the fringe, the total eciency of the market increases when strategic rm i increases its R&D expenses k i .
The fringe rms are price takers on the nal market and therefore all set their output so that the nal price is equal to their marginal cost. We dene Q s ≡ q 1 + q 2 and we denote by q f (Q s , n) the resulting output of one fringe rm. In stage 4, by symmetry, we thus have:
It is immediate that q f is decreasing in Q s : as the output of strategic rms increases, the price decreases and each fringe rm must thus set a lower output to reduce its marginal cost. However, an increase of the strategic rms' output still always leads to an increase of total output (and hence a decrease of the nal price). Indeed, deriving equation (1) with respect to Q s yields:
In the third stage of the game, strategic rms then set their output anticipating the fringe rms' decision. Firm i's programme is then:
and the corresponding rst order condition is:
In the following, we dene the equilibrium outcome of the quantity-setting subgame by the use of an asterisk (for instance the equilibrium price is p * ). A comparative statics analysis of these values with respect to R&D input purchase allows us to highlight the eect of R&D when the size of the fringe is given. We also determine the eect of n on prices and outputs.
9 Obviously, we must also ensure that fringe rms earn a positive total prot (taking into account the cost of purchasing R&D). As we will see later on however, rms only enter the fringe if they are sure to earn a positive prot, and the equilibrium size of the fringe is given by a 0 prot condition.
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Comparative statics with respect to R&D input endowment. First, it is immediate that rm i's best reply output is increasing in its own R&D input endowment since
By contrast, the best reply output of i's rival is not aected by a change in i's R&D input endowment:
we show in Appendix A.1 that the strategic rms' output decisions are strategic substitutes. As a consequence, assuming that there exists a unique equilibrium of the quantity-setting subgame, the equilibrium output choices are such that ∂q * i /∂k i > 0, ∂q * j /∂k i < 0 and ∂q * i /∂k i +∂q * j /∂k i > 0. In other words, for a given size of the fringe, the output of a strategic rm increases with its R&D input endowment more than the parallel decrease of its strategic rival's output and of the fringe's output.
Consider now the eect of k i on a fringe rm's output q * f and consequently on the nal price p * . Indeed, it should be noted that since p * = C (q * f ), it is immediate that p * and q * f vary similarly with k i (as well as with all other parameters). As q * f = q f (q * 1 + q * 2 , n), the output of each fringe rm decreases with the R&D input endowment of any strategic rm.
Therefore, for a given size of the competitive fringe, the nal price decreases with k i . This eect is straightforward and can be explained as follows: when the marginal cost of production of a rm is reduced, everything else being equal, the industry becomes globally more ecient and consequently, the nal price decreases while the total output increases. We denote this eect eciency enhancing eect.
Comparative statics with respect to the size of the fringe. Noticing that
of the number of fringe rms on the nal price is given by the following equation:
Besides, deriving equation (1) with respect to n yields:
Finally, from (2) and (4), we deduce that ∂q f /∂n = q f ∂q f /∂Q s , which gives us a simpler expression of the variation of p * with respect to n:
We then nd as in Riordan (1998) that the nal price p * is decreasing in the size of the fringe n. Indeed we show in Appendix A.2 that the additional output produced by one more rm in the fringe is higher than the output loss of incumbent rms following this entry, and therefore total output Q * = q * 1 + q * 2 + nq * f increases when the size of the fringe increases. However, as shown in Appendix A.2, the output of a strategic rm always decreases with n: the direct eect of n on q * i is always stronger than its indirect eect through reducing the rest of the fringe's output.
Entry decision of the fringe rms
Consider now Stage 2 of the game. Competition on the upstream market determines the number of fringe rms that enter the market. Indeed, in order to enter the market, a fringe rm must buy one unit of R&D input at the market price R. Fringe rms enter as long as this entry cost is lower than their prots on the output market.
As a consequence, for a given pair (k 1 , k 2 ), the size of the fringe is determined by the following equation:
where K = k 1 + k 2 . We denote the equilibrium size of the fringe by n * (k 1 , k 2 ).
Lemma 1. The size of the fringe decreases with the R&D input endowment of any strategic rm.
Proof. Equation (5) is satised for all values of k i . Therefore, the derivative of expression (5) gives us the following equation:
11 which we can rewrite:
Given that R > 0,
An increase in rm i's R&D input purchase has two parallel eects on fringe rms. First, for a given size of the fringe, the nal price and the output of each fringe rm decrease: the industry becomes globally more ecient, but only rm i benets from it as all its rivals become less ecient relative to i. As a consequence, the short-term prot of a fringe rm, i.e. its prot on the nal market, decreases.
Parallel to this, as the total demand for R&D input increases, the market price of the R&D input, hence the cost of entry on the market R(K), increases.
The consequence of these two eects is that less rms enter the fringe when strategic rms purchase more R&D input. Therefore, the purchase of R&D input by a strategic rm has a second eect parallel to the eciency enhancing eect highlighted previously: it increases market concentration. Finally, as the nal price increases when the size of the fringe shrinks, the eciency enhancing and market concentration eects are contradictory. We thus have to determine the conditions that ensure that the nal price raises following an increase of R&D input purchase.
From here on, we use a double asterisk for outcomes of the equilibrium of the subgame including Stages 2 to 4 (for instance, the equilibrium price is p * * ).
Comparative statics with respect to R&D input endowment. Equation (6) gives us a simple expression of the price variation following R&D input purchase: ∂p * * /∂k i = R /q * * f , from which we immediately deduce the following proposition.
This proposition is an extension of Riordan (1998) to a framework with two strategic rms.
Proposition 1. In the subgame composed of Stages 2 to 4, the equilibrium nal price p * * is increasing in k i .
In particular, if there is a capacity constraint on the amount of R&D input available, then assuming that the market is such that fringe rms buy all the remaining R&D inputs after strategic rms' purchasing decision, then if rm i increases its R&D input purchase by one unit, it excludes one rm from the fringe, which results in a higher nal price.
As a consequence, as long as R&D decisions of one rm on the market has an impact on its rivals' R&D decisions, the price increasing eect of R&D may arise.
This may be the case when R&D needs specic inputs such as high skilled workers or a given amount of time slots to use a specic facility. Therefore, although an increase of R&D expenses following the creation of a R&D agreement is considered desirable, as it increases eciency on the market, such an increase of expenses, shall it occur, may not have the expected competitive eects. In Section 4, we will analyze how assumptions on R&D purchase aect our results.
Focusing now on rms' output decisions, it is immediate that the output of strategic rm i increases with k i . This results both from the eciency enhancing and from the market concentration that follow an increase of i's R&D investment.
Paradoxically, an increase of k i may also increase the output of rm i's strategic rival:
this happens when the market concentration eect osets the eciency enhancing eect, which happens under the conditions described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If we assume that C is three times dierentiable and p (C )
2 C is not too negative, then the output of strategic rm j (j ∈ {1, 2}) increases with k i (i ∈ {1, 2}, i = j).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Note that this condition only needs to be true in equilibrium. This is all the more likely to happen that the cost function of fringe rms is convex enough and the inverse demand function is convex. In that case, an increase of k i tends to reduce fringe rms' revenue more, and therefore the number of fringe rms decreases faster with k i than when the cost function is not too convex. In other words, the market concentration eect is all the stronger that the cost function C is more convex. It is also more likely that one strategic rm's output increases with its strategic rival's R&D endowment when the inverse demand function is not too steep. In that case, the reason is that the eciency enhancing eect is less strong than with a steep inverse demand curve, which benets i's strategic rival.
Finally, it should be noted that the latter condition is satised with rather standard demand and cost functions. For instance, it is satised when the cost function 13 is quadratic and demand is linear or iso-elastic.
R&D decisions of strategic rms
We now determine conditions that ensure that strategic rms invest more in R&D when they cooperate than when they compete on the upstream market.
Anticipating decisions in the following stages of the game, strategic rms make their R&D input purchase decisions by each maximizing its individual prot in the competitive case, and maximizing the joint-prot of the two strategic rms in the cooperative case. Thus, rm i maximizes π i in the competitive case and π i + π j in the cooperative case, where prots of strategic rms are given by:
Then, it is worth noting that the only dierence between competition and cooperation on the upstream market is that rm i takes into account the eect of its own investment on the prot of rm j in addition to its eect on its own prot. In particular, assuming that rm i's R&D investment is equal to its competitive best reply to k j , which we denote BR(k j ), then the additionnal eect that i must take into account is given by the following equation:
Then a rm will buy more R&D input in cooperation than in competition if and
This eect can be decomposed into three parts that may be contradictory: the nal price eect (I), the output eect (II) and the cost eect (III). The comparative statics of (I) and (II) with respect to k i are described in the previous subsection: the nal price increases with k i and so does rm j's output under some conditions.
By constrast, it is straightforward that the cost eect is negative: an increase of k i increases the unit cost of R&D and thus j's cost of R&D (at k j given). The following proposition gives some insights as to the eect of cooperation on strategic rms' R&D investments.
Proposition 3. Strategic rms increase investment in R&D in cooperation relative
to competition when:
-The demand for strategic rm i's good does not decrease to much with j's (j = i) R&D input purchase (i.e. p (C )
-The cost advantage of strategic rms is high enough (i.e. γ is low enough).
Proof. The rst condition is immediate and derives from Proposition 2:
is more likely to be positive if an increase of k i increases q j , which happens under the rst condition.
The second condition ensures that the price eect is high enough relative to the cost eect. Indeed, we know that ∂p * * /∂k i = R /q * * f . Therefore, the sum of these two eects is given by ∂p * * /∂k i q * * j − k j R = R q * * j /q * * f − k j . This implies that the price eect osets the cost eect if and only if q * * j > k j q * * f , which is equivalent
Besides, from equations (1) and (3), we nd that p * * = C (q * * f ) > γC q * * j /k i . Therefore, there exists γ * ∈ [0, 1) such that the price eect osets the cost eect if γ < γ * and the opposite happens otherwise.
Finally, when determining how much to invest in R&D in cooperation relative to the competitive level, a strategic rm must solve the trade-o between its eect on both the fringe rms and its strategic rival.
To this extent, increasing k i allows strategic rm i to increase the competitive pressure faced by fringe rms, but at the same time increases competition between the two strategic rms. This trade-o is essentially described by (II), that is the output eect: On the one hand, for a given number of fringe rms, an increase of k i reduces i's production cost and leads to a decrease of rm j's output. On the other hand, as k i increases, the size of the fringe decreases, which is benecial to rm j. Then, depending on which of these two eects prevails, the eect of k i on output can be either positive or negative, as shown in the previous subsection. This eect corresponds to the rst condition in Proposition 3.
Similarly, increasing k i both increases fringe rms' entry costs and the rival strategic rm's R&D expenses. Again, depending on which of the two eects prevails, the eect of k i on rm j's prot can be either positive or negative. This eect corresponds to the second condition in Proposition 3. Indeed, increasing fringe rms' entry costs results in less entry, which increases the nal price. Then, the more R increases with k i , the faster the nal price increase following an increase of k i . The eect on strategic rm j is however symmetrical: the higher R , the more j's R&D expenses increase with k i . Finally, the latter eect osets the former only when strategic rms are ecient enough relative to fringe rms, which implies that a strategic rm's output per unit of R&D is higher than a fringe rm's output (per unit of R&D).
Finally, it is important to note that in cases where strategic rms indeed buy more R&D input in cooperation than in competition, they do so in the sole purpose of excluding fringe rms and increasing nal price. As a consequence, despite the efciency gains resulting from more R&D, the eect of R&D cooperation on consumer surplus is negative when the condition given in Proposition 3 are satised. In that case, the strategy of strategic rms can be described as over-buying or strategic buying.
Benchmarks
In this section, we disentangle the dierent eects explaining our previous result by comparing our model to two benchmarks. In particular, we show that the collusive over-buying strategy neither occurs when the size of the fringe is xed, nor when the cost of R&D for one rm only depends on its own R&D input purchase.
R&D input purchase when the size of the fringe is exogenous
We have shown that under free entry in the competitive fringe, the strategic rms may buy more R&D input in cooperation than in competition. By contrast, we show here that if the size of the fringe is xed, then strategic rms never buy more R&D input in cooperation than in competition.
Consider the following framework. We assume that there is no competitive fringe, and that the two strategic rms thus only compete against each other.
10 The game has only two stages: First, the two rms simultaneously invest in R&D, and rm i's R&D input demand is still denoted by k i . Second, they simultaneously set their 10 The results we obtain are robust to the presence of a competitive fringe with a xed size.
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quantities on the nal market. We determine the competitive R&D investment k * and the cooperative R&D investment k c of each rm in the symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In the absence of a competitive fringe, rms buy less R&D input in the cooperative equilibrium than in the competitive equilibrium:
Proof. See A.4.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In both cases (endogenous or exogenous competitive fringe), the purpose of cooperating strategic rms is the same: They seek to reduce competition on the nal market in order to increase nal prices.
However, the means to reduce competition are dierent, depending on whether the size of the fringe is exogenous or endogenous. If it is exogenous, then strategic rms can only reduce competition among themselves. In order to do so, they buy less R&D input than in the competitive equilibrium, hence decreasing their production cost less and nally, softening competition on the nal market as compared to the competitive case. By contrast, when the size of the fringe is endogenous, strategic rms have an incentive to reduce competition by increasing market concentration.
They do so by increasing their R&D input purchase, hence driving rms out of the competitive fringe. If the eect of k i on fringe rms is high enough relative to its eect on i's strategic rival, strategic rms buy more R&D input in cooperation than in competition. Obviously, this can never happen when buying more R&D input has no eect on the size of the fringe.
R&D choices with independent costs of R&D
In this subsection, we show that there is no collusive strategic buying of R&D input if a rm's R&D purchase does not aect its competitors' costs.
Assume that the cost of the R&D input for a rm is only a function of its own R&D input purchase, which we denote by R(k), where k is the R&D input purchase by the concerned rm. As in the previous section, we rst analyze the eect of k i on the nal price, and then compare the cooperative and competitive strategies of strategic rms.
Lemma 3. When the R&D cost of a rm only depends on its own R&D investment and not on its rivals' investment, the nal price p * * is constant with k i .
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Proof. See Appendix A.5
When the fringe rms' cost of entry is not aected by other rms' purchases, the market concentration eect exactly osets the eciency enhancing eect, and the nal price is not aected by strategic rms' R&D input purchase. Then, the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 4. When the R&D cost of a rm only depends on its own R&D investment and not on its rivals' investment, strategic rms always invest less in R&D in cooperation than in competition.
Proof. Equation (8) becomes:
for the increased R&D input purchase of k i has no eect on fringe rms' and j's cost of buying R&D input anymore, and the nal price is unchanged following an increase of k i . Then, using equation (17) and the inequality −∂q *
It is a standard result that in the absence of spillovers, rms invest less in R&D when they cooperate than when they compete (see D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). We show here that another crucial assumption for this result to hold is that the cost of R&D of one rm is independent of other rms' R&D input purchase.
Indeed, in that case rm j cannot benet from an increase of k i : If rm i buys more R&D input, nal price remains unchanged but rm j's output decreases because of its relative loss of eciency. Besides, the size of the fringe never shrinks so much that this osets j's output loss.
As a consequence, by not taking into account that many inputs necessary for R&D processes are available in limited quantity and sold at a common price to all the rms in an industry, one will miss the potential price increasing eect of R&D input purchase. Nevertheless, if large rms have easier access to some necessary facilities than small rms, increasing R&D eorts may be perceived as an overbuying strategy by large rms, in an attempt to prevent or reduce the access of small rivals to the same facilities.
5 Welfare analysis
We now illustrate our result with a numerical example. We show that in our framework, R&D cooperation decreases consumer surplus as well as total welfare.
We assume in the following that the inverse demand function on the downstream market is p(Q) = 1 − Q where Q = q 1 + q 2 + nq f is total output. The cost function of a fringe rm is quadratic and given by C(q f ) = q 2 f /2, and consequently, we have
Finally, we assume that the R&D input supply function is R(K) = K 2 /z, where z is a positive parameter and K = k 1 + k 2 is the total purchase of R&D input. As previously, we compare R&D input purchase decisions when strategic rms are competing and cooperating on the market for R&D input.
Consider rst the output decision of fringe rms. Each fringe rm sets q f so that its marginal cost is equal to nal price, which implies q f = p. The resulting residual demand for strategic rms is then given by RD(p) = 1 − p − nq f and the associated inverse demand function is p(
The equilibrium outputs and nal price are thus given by:
.
The equilibrium size of the fringe rm is given by p 2 /2 = (k1 + k2) 2 /z. Because of computation issues, we only simulate the resulting R&D input purchases in the two relevant cases. We set z = 2. We see on the left-hand side of Figure 1 that strategic rms always invest more in R&D in cooperation than in competition here and that the dierence between k c and k * decreases with γ. When γ is low, the eciency advantage of strategic rms over fringe rms is high, and therefore, a strategic rm benets more from an increase of its R&D input endowment. The fringe thus suers all the more from an increase of k i that γ is higher. The over-buying strategy of cooperative strategic rms is thus stronger when they are very ecient relative to their smaller rivals. However, although one would then expect nal price to decrease due to the enhancing of global eciency, this never happens, as is predicted by Proposition 1: the cooperative nal price is also higher than the competitive nal price for all γ ∈ [0, 1). Consumer surplus here is simply given by SC = (1 − p) 2 /2, from which we deduce that consumer surplus is always lower when strategic rms cooperate in R&D than when they compete in R&D. Total welfare is then given by W = π * 1 + π * 2 + SC.
As Figure 2 shows, welfare is lower with R&D cooperation than competition for all values of γ.
The inverted U-shape of R&D purchase, and consequently of nal prices, comes from two dierent eects. When γ is close to 1, the cost advantage of a strategic rm over the fringe is very low. Then, an increase of i's R&D purchase does not increase its cost advantage so much. This explains why as γ decreases, strategic rms increase their R&D purchases in competition as well as in cooperation. By contrast, when γ is close to 0, the cost advantage of a strategic rm is already so high that strategic rms sell most of the output. Then, an increase of i's R&D purchase, while highly increasing its cost advantage, cannot lead to a very high output increase and hence does not benet the strategic rm. This explains why R&D input purchase decreases as γ tends to 0.
Extensions
In this section, using the framework specied in Section 5, we show that our result is robust to some extent to allowing the R&D cost to also depend on fringe rms' R&D input demand and to adding synergies resulting from cooperation. Finally, we assume that strategic rms collude on the nal market in addition to cooperating on the upstream market and determine whether cooperative R&D facilitates cooperation on the downstream market.
R&D costs depending on total demand for R&D
We assume here that the cost of R&D investment does not only depend on strategic rms' demand for R&D but also on the fringe rms' demand. More precisely, we consider the following supply function: R(k 1 +k 2 +n) = (k 1 + k 2 + n) 2 /z with z > 0.
The equilibrium of the output-decision subgame is similar to that found in Section 5. What changes is the R&D investment stage. In Table 1 , we give the results of the simulation. Then, with z = 2.10 6 , we observe that k c is higher than k * as long as γ < 0.2, which is consistant with Proposition 3: cooperative over-buying is all the more likely to happen that strategic rms are more ecient relative to the fringe. From the table, we also observe that consumer surplus (through nal price) as well as total welfare are lower in cooperation than in competition when γ < 0.2 and higher otherwise. Finally, even when we assume that R&D costs depend on the fringe's demand as well as on the demand from strategic rms, cooperative over-buying may still occur and is always harmful to consumers as well as to society. 
Synergies from cooperation
We assume here that when strategic rms enter an R&D agreement, they enjoy full synergies from each other's R&D investment. The eect of an R&D agreement then is similar to the eect of a merger in Perry and Porter (1985) . The production cost of rm i thus becomes (k 1 + k 2 )γC (q i /(k 1 + k 2 )) when strategic rms cooperate in R&D. We consider again the example described in Section 5. Then, strategic rms still over-buy in cooperation with respect to competition for low enough values of γ. As before, only in cases where k c > k * do we also have p c > p * , which implies that over-buying still harms consumer surplus even when cooperation induces full synergies. However, the eect of cooperation on total welfare then is positive because strategic rms benet from cooperation in two ways: First, as in the absence of synergies, over-buying increases nal price by reducing entry into the fringe. Second, in addition, R&D cooperation with synergies decreases strategic rms' production cost, which is not the case in the absence of synergies.
Downstream collusion
Note that in a framework with a competitive fringe, standard collusive strategies relying on output reduction are not protable, for the fringe's reaction to an output reduction by strategic rms wipes out the subsequent price increase. We thus consider here the case where strategic rms collude both on the input and the output market, and show that in our framework, R&D cooperation is not a means to 22 facilitate collusion on the nal market.
For simplicity, consider again the specic framework described in the Section 5.
Assume that strategic rms now maximize the joint prot of the strategic duopoly both on the R&D input market and on the nal market, i.e. enforce collusion on the nal market.
Output decisions of the fringe rms are again given by p = q f and the residual inverse demand function is still p(Q s ). Then, rm i sets output q i to maximize prot
The collusive outputs and nal price are thus given by:
Unsurprisingly, for a given size of the fringe, the resulting nal price (and hence the output of a fringe rm) is higher than in the competitive equilibrium. Besides, if strategic rms both buy the same amount of R&D input, rm i's output is reduced in collusion as compared to competition. The direct consequence however is that more rms enter the fringe than in the competitive case: n M (k, k) > n * (k, k) for any k > 1, which reduces the nal price as well as the output of strategic rms. Then, if the dierence between n M and n * is high enough, the prot of strategic rm is higher in competition than in collusion for any value of k. For z = 2.10 6 , it is always the case that the prot of a strategic rm in competition is higher than its prot in collusion:
In other words, it is impossible for strategic rms to earn a higher prot when they enforce collusion successively on the market for R&D input and on the nal market than when they only cooperate on the market for R&D input. Indeed, collusion on the nal market increases the nal price and therefore facilitates entry in the competitive fringe. Eventually, the increased competition on the nal market more than osets the initial price increase.
The usual concerns regarding the potential anti-competitive eects of R&D agreements are that cooperation at any stage of the production process (here, R&D)
can facilitate cooperation in other stages, and in particular at the pricing stage. In-terestingly enough, in our case, collusion on the nal market would not be protable for strategic rms. More importantly, the anti-competitive eect of R&D we observe thus does not result from softer competition between strategic rms on the nal market: It results from softer competition between strategic rms and the competitive fringe, which has been analyzed in the previous Sections.
Conclusion
In this paper, we highlight an anti-competitive eect of R&D agreements that has not been pointed out in the previous literature. In order to engage in R&D, rms must purchase specic inputs including high skilled workers or time slots for the use of a rare facility. Such inputs are necessary to all the rms engaging in the same type of research. Consequently, rms that compete to sell a nal good are also likely to compete to purchase the inputs necessary to R&D.
We show that in such situations, if there are large size or cost asymmetries between rms on the market, as can be the case in industries such as software designing or pharmaceutical R&D, large rms with market power may engage in R&D cooperation for anti-competitive purposes. Cooperation may then induce them to overbuy the input, i.e. to buy more input than they would otherwise, so as to increase the input price or make it less available to small rms, and thus to exclude them from the nal market. This strategy is all the more likely to occur that large rms are very ecient relative to their small rivals. In such a context, while one would expect nal prices to decrease due to enhanced eciency, the market concentration eect induces an increase in the nal price. Such agreements thus harm consumer surplus.
A Appendix

A.1 Strategic substitutes
We show here that when the size of the fringe n is xed, the output decisions of the strategic rms are strategic substitutes. Deriving equation (3) 
A.2 Comparative statics over n
We prove here that ∂q * i ∂n < 0 for any i ∈ {1, 2}, and:
which implies that when the size of the fringe increases, total output also increases, while the output of strategic rms decreases.
We rst show tyhat total output increases with n. We consider two possible cases: either strategic rms' output increases or decreases with n. 
since for any value of n, we always have that A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
When the cost of a rm only depends on its own R&D investment, equation (5) becomes simply p * q * f −C(q * f ) = R, and equation (6) 
Obviously, it is still negative as the short-term prot of fringe rms is still reduced following an increase of k i . However, since q * * f > 0, it is straightforward that we now have ∂p * * /∂k i = 0.
